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Abstract In the western healthcare, shared decision making has become the
orthodox approach to making healthcare choices as a way of promoting patient
autonomy. Despite the fact that the autonomy paradigm is poorly suited to paedi-
atric decision making, such an approach is enshrined in English common law. When
reaching moral decisions, for instance when it is unclear whether treatment or non-
treatment will serve a child’s best interests, shared decision making is particularly
questionable because agreement does not ensure moral validity. With reference to
current common law and focusing on intensive care practice, this paper investigates
what claims shared decision making may have to legitimacy in a paediatric inten-
sive care setting. Drawing on key texts, I suggest these identify advantages to
parents and clinicians but not to the child who is the subject of the decision. Without
evidence that shared decision making increases the quality of the decision that is
being made, it appears that a focus on the shared nature of a decision does not
cohere with the principle that the best interests of the child should remain para-
mount. In the face of significant pressures toward the displacement of the child’s
interests in a shared decision, advantages of a shared decision to decisional quality
require elucidation. Although a number of arguments of this nature may have
potential, should no such advantages be demonstrable we have cause to revise our
commitment to either shared decision making or the paramountcy of the child in
these circumstances.
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Introduction
Shared decision-making (SDM) is widely advocated within current healthcare
practice, but its legitimacy as a model of decision-making for infants and other
incompetent patients has been questioned [76]. Despite this, when making decisions
for children, English law1 says clinicians and parents should try to agree where the
child’s best interests lie. Moral legitimacy does not necessarily depend on the
agreement of interested parties, so just agreeing a child’s best interests does not
guarantee that they are really being served. While this problem might be addressed
by including the child within the decision making process,2 in environments such as
paediatric intensive care where most patients are either too young or too disabled to
take part this is impossible. Because of this, where the child has no antecedent
wishes and is either too young or too disabled to otherwise take part, the moral
legitimacy of SDM between parents and clinicians in the determination of a child’s
best interests (what I term paediatric shared decision-making—PSDM) requires
consideration. Although scholars debate the degree to which the best interests3 test
is objective or philosophically robust [5, 10, 37], the moral legitimacy of the model
of PSDM promoted in English law has yet to be considered. This paper argues that
PSDM may be incoherent with the claim that the interests of children are
paramount, a central claim in legal conceptions of best interests.4
1 By English law I mean the law in England and Wales. Northern Irish law generally considers children’s
best interests in the same way, although there are some differences with Scottish law, especially in its
consideration of adolescent consent and refusal.
2 Exactly how much weight a child’s views should be given is a contentious topic. While radical child
liberationists argue that children of all ages should possess the same rights as adults, a majority of thinkers
hold children’s views are not equal to those of their parents and doctors while the child is immature. Judging
when children attain maturity may rely on their ability to understand and process information and formulate
reasonable, stable conclusions, abilities of which age is often argued to be an arbitrary measure. These
debates shall not be discussed further here, but a good introduction is found in Archard [4] pp. 70–97. For
discussion of the somewhat contradictory approach of UK law on this issue see Elliston [25] pp. 47–94.
3 The concept of best interests does not of course have a settled meaning. It is clear that in much of English
law best interests are taken to be a person’s preferences (e.g. Mental Capacity Act 2005), although concepts
such as suffering are also used in children e.g. [66]. A seminal paper by David DeGrazia explains that best
interests can be interpreted in three ways; as personal preferences, as mental states (e.g. pleasure and
suffering) or as objective lists (e.g. Rawls’ natural primary goods [60]). None of these theories is without
criticism, for instance mental states may be false or transient, preferences may be mistaken and objective lists
may be impossible to discover or apply. In the case of those who are unable to communicate we have no
access to either their wishes or their mental state, and despite many attempts, there is no generally agreed
objective criteria. This epistemological problem of not being able to know what best interests are is thus
central to debates about how we should make decisions in PSDM. See DeGrazia [20].
4 An example of this in English law is found in the Children Act 1989s. 1, which states: ‘‘the child’s
welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration.’’ The paramountcy principle has been argued to
imply certain unpalatable outcomes, for instance that parents should be doing what is best for a child at
the expense of the wider family’s integrity and wellbeing, or paradoxical ones, for instance that we must
give every child what is best even when what is available is satisfactory. This paper is not to consider
such philosophical conundrums. Instead I shall take it as read that we ought to value children and promote
their interests in adult affairs, even if, as some commentators maintain, such promotion means we should
allow families independence to make decisions or that we should accept that some children would be
better off dead.
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Focusing on disagreements about a child’s quality of life where it is disputed
whether intensive care or withdrawal serves a child’s best interests, I detail how
current English law suggests resolving such disputes with PSDM. While SDM has
been widely promoted within healthcare practice, the impetus for this has been to
assure the autonomy of patients is respected in the clinical encounter. Yet in PSDM
the autonomy rationale is incoherent because the child has no known wishes or
feelings on which parent proxies may base their authority. Instead, PSDM appears
more roundly to be justified by the contentious nature of unilateral decision-making,
since the locus of moral authority does not appear to lie clearly with any decision-
making party. Apparent advantages for active participants of PSDM, as well as
society at large, are contained in the literature, yet there are no suggestions that the
child might benefit by, say, a better decision being made. Indeed, since agreement,
rather than the quality of the decision, is the focus of PSDM, it seems incongruent
with the claim that the best interests of the child are paramount, especially since the
opacity of children’s best interests means there are already risks these will be
conflated with one or other negotiating party. Further, since the literature also
speculates that SDM imposes demanding criteria upon decision makers, but
evidence shows the courts are rarely approached, it is unclear if decision makers are
able to collaborate effectively in practice, or if this further undermines the interests
of children. Although I sketch reasons why there may be advantages for the child in
PSDM, they require deeper elucidation if we are to robustly defend this approach;
absent such reasons, if we remain committed to PSDM, we must re-evaluate the way
we promote the child’s best interests.
Best Interests in English Law
The best interests test has been in English statute for almost a century5 and is a
widespread international standard as a result of the near unanimous adoption of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child [84]. In paediatric healthcare
English law favours a process in which parents and clinicians agree a common
understanding of the child’s best interests. If agreement is impossible, a judge
determines the ‘‘objective’’ interests of the child and rules appropriately.6
Medical law reaches this standpoint through several cases in which children’s
best interests were seen to extend beyond medical interests. Re J [66] has become
the leading case on the matter: J was born at 27 weeks gestation and his prematurity
caused brain damage, convulsions and spastic quadriplegia. His doctors wished to
withhold artificial ventilation but were opposed by the Official Solicitor. The Court
5 As a doctrine of common law it is considerably more ancient. The earliest references to a best interests
standard lie within child custody law, and the concept of best interests is usually seen as the modern
descendant of the sovereign’s parens patriae protection. It was in Blisset’s Case [1774] the best interest
principle was first articulated by Lord Mansfield CJ who stated:’’ if the parties disagreed, the court will do
what shall appear best for the child’’. When the welfare principle first entered the law in the Guardianship
of Infants Act 1925, it was still a principle of custodial adjudication, rather than a general principle in the
treatment of children.
6 The nature of this judicial objectivity is widely disputed. For instance see: Baines [5].
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of Appeal ruled that because J had an extremely poor quality of life and no prospect
of improvement, withholding ventilation was in his best interests. Re J established
that the parents’ opinions of a child’s best interests should be considered as part of a
joint decision:
No one can dictate the treatment to be given to the child, neither court, parents
nor doctors. There are checks and balances. The doctors can recommend
treatment A in preference to treatment B. They can also refuse to adopt treatment
C on the grounds that it is medically contra-indicated or for some other reason is a
treatment which they could not conscientiously administer. The court or parents
for their part can refuse to consent to treatment A or B or both, but cannot insist
on treatment C. The inevitable and desirable result is that choice of treatment is
in some measure a joint decision of the doctors and the court or parents7
Subsequent developments in adult jurisprudence,8 caused best interests to be
further clarified in Wyatt [59]9 to include issues of emotion and welfare as well as
medical considerations, and by the time of Glass v UK [30] a collaborative approach
was already usual in practice.10 Glass v UK concerned 15 years old David Glass, who
had spastic quadriplegia, hydrocephalus and severe learning difficulties, and had been
recurrently admitted to intensive care with chest infections. Believing David was in the
terminal phase of recurrent respiratory illness, doctors began a diamorphine infusion
despite his family’s opposition, refused to let them take David home to die and,
without seeking their consent, placed a ‘‘do not resuscitate’’ order in his medical notes.
The European Court of Human Rights ruled that, in neither seeking a proxy’s consent
for his treatment, nor approaching the courts for an appropriate order, David’s article 8
rights to privacy and family life had been violated. The effect was to underline both the
authoritative nature parental consent to treatment, and the ultimate authority of the
courts where this parental authority was to be challenged.
Although medical views of best interests generally prevail, the case of MB [2]
was a clear demonstration of the courts’ ability to substitute its own opinion on these
matters.11 In this case, doctors sought to fatally withdraw ventilation from an infant
with spinal muscular atrophy, a degenerative disease that causes progressive muscle
weakness, leading to ventilator dependency and, eventually, complete paralysis.
Refusing to grant legal permission for withdrawal, Holman LJ suggested MB’s
relationship with his family and the pleasures he derived from sensory stimulation
were not outweighed by the pain and discomfort of his ongoing care. Instead he
7 Re J [66] at 41 per Lord Donaldson MR.
8 The cases referred to in Wyatt are Re A (Male Sterilisation) [63] and Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation)
[69] .
9 Therein doctors sought a court order that it would be in severely disabled Charlotte Wyatt’s best
interests to withhold ventilation should she require it.
10 A reading of Glass v UK also shows attempts at SDM between physicians and parents, suggesting
SDM was indeed the norm at this time. Such an approach is also advocated in the near contemporaneous
second edition of withdrawal guidelines from the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health [72].
11 Another example is Re T [70] where a mother successfully argued against her child receiving a liver
transplant.
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proposed a compromise, in which MB’s ventilation and everyday care continued,
but further aggressive measures that would keep him alive were withheld.12
Re J, Glass v UK, and MB are of interest, because they involve judgement of best
interests where there is apparently legitimate ethical dispute about whether the
child’s life is worth living if treatment is continued, rather than whether medical
treatment would be effective.13 The evolving judicial approach in these cases,
particularly that seen in MB, may be to arrive at some form of compromise where
each party’s point of view is taken into account in the final decision. I will consider
if this legal process is ethically supportable, yet there remains a further question of
how it manifests in practice. This is difficult to determine, because, while court
judgments are within the public domain, it is apparent the vast majority of cases
reach a solution through parent-clinician negotiation. Brierley et al. [11] provide a
rare insight into the negotiation process within one large paediatric intensive care
unit. Over a 3 years period, in all but seventeen of 203 cases where clinicians
recommended withdrawal of life sustaining treatment, parents agreed. Of the
seventeen disputed cases, only one reached the courts, the remainder being resolved
either through unusually protracted negotiation or the death of the child because of
their illness. This picture is born out in the court records where only six similar
disputes appear to have been reported since MB [2] in 2006.14 While, if we take
avoidance of the courts as a mark of success, these figures suggest parties may be
reaching amicable agreement, without empirical investigation it is impossible to
conclude whether it is on an ethically defensible basis. Certainly a large number of
factors might potentially favour intransigence on the part of one or other decision
maker in the case of conflict. Pressures such as the cost and scarcity of an inpatient
bed and the evolving nature of illness may play a large role in such negotiation, and
an obdurate party may gain undue influence over the process.15
12 Specifically antibiotics, blood sampling and lengthy cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
13 It has been argued that we should concentrate upon the moral justifications of resource scarcity, rather
than medical futility and best interests as a means to determine if treatment is continued. A detailed
exploration of the implications of such an approach would be worthwhile, however I choose in this paper
to concentrate upon the needs of the child rather than the community at large, and thus will not discuss
this argument further. See [77, 86].
14 A search of the Westlaw database in June 2013 (using keywords including withdrawal, children,
medical, life sustaining treatment, parental consent) produced the following cases where doctors proposed
treatment be withdrawn or withheld: Re K [67]—a child with a neuromuscular disorder where permission
to remove an intravenous line providing nutrition was granted; Re B [64]—a child with an unknown
metabolic condition where leave to withhold ventilation if required was granted; Re OT [68]—a 9 months
old child with genetic abnormalities, ventilator dependent, severe brain damage where leave to withdraw
ventilation and withhold further treatment was granted; Re B [65]—A father who disagreed about
withdrawal of ventilation from his son, who had a neurological disorder, the case was resolved when the
father withdrew his objection; NHS Trust v Baby X [53]—Withdrawal of ventilation from a child with a
catastrophic brain injury, although opposed by the family, was allowed; NHS Trust v H [54] an advance
care plan that limited treatment of a child with a severe brain injury was upheld, despite opposition by his
mother. Although not the focus of the search an additional two oncology cases where doctors petitioned to
treat against the wishes of the parent were also produced, An NHS Trust v A [1] and An NHS Trust v SR
[3].
15 I do not claim this intransigence is malicious or conniving, and note it may be equally effective when
used by parents or clinicians depending on the situation. My main concern is that the child may get lost
within the dispute. I will develop this argument as the paper proceeds.
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In order to decide if PSDM is morally legitimate, we need empirical investigation
of the content of bedside decisions.16 We must also answer some normative
questions. If we are to defend PSDM we must suggest why decisions arrived at from
intransigence are less morally defensible than those that were arrived at by PSDM,
for, presuming the decision is right, why should coercion be morally reprehensible,
if the child’s interests are paramount? The answers to these questions lie in
considering the uncertain locus of moral authority, the clarity with which we can
identify children’s interests, and the urgency of the situation. Before we turn to these
concerns, let us briefly clarify the concept of SDM within healthcare generally and
consider its awkward relationship to paediatrics.
The Concept of Shared Decision-Making
Over several decades, SDM has become an increasingly important feature in
healthcare as a way of ensuring patient autonomy, although it has been subject to a
degree of conceptual confusion [15, 26, 51].17 In a widely cited typology of
decision-making, Charles et al. [15] identify unilateral models where the locus of
control is either with the clinician or the patient. In paternalism, the doctor makes
the decision they think best. In the informed patient model, the doctor is relegated to
information giver, and the patient makes the decision. In the professional-as-agent
model, the doctor, aware of the patient’s health needs18 and furnished with the
patient’s social situation and values, makes the decision that serves them all.
Charles et al. [15] differentiate SDM from these unilateral models by its
involvement of two or more willing participants who share information to reach a
16 I am conducting an empirical project which may begin to answer some of them. ‘Judging Best
Interests in the Paediatric Intensive Care Unit: The Location, Basis and Scope of Decision Making
(BIPIC)’ is an empirical ethics project supported by a Wellcome Trust Clinical Fellowship in Biomedical
Ethics (Grant WT097725MF). It involves qualitative semi-structured interviews with parents of children
who have been patients on PICU, members of clinical ethics committees and PICU doctors and nurses to
explore their experiences and perceptions of key ethical concepts used in decisions about children in
PICU who have no antecedent wishes.
17 While I have focused upon the parents and clinicians, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who
raised the issue of the extent to which families are in fact involved in the shared decision making process.
Roy Gilbar’s recent research [28, 29] highlights the desire of adult decision makers to include significant
others in the decision making process, but the reticence of the law and clinicians to recognise the validity
of their involvement. While being beyond the scope of this paper, such research is obviously of interest,
for instance in conjunction with other explorations of involving extended family in decisions about
children. For example Ladd and Mercurio [43] discuss the validity of treatment decisions emanating from
the grandparents of neonatal patients, suggesting this may be acceptable since they may offer more
mature perspectives. Similar justification may be drawn from Zamvar et al. [88] who note that
grandparents may be more physically capable of serving the best interests of infants who are receiving
complex therapies in the community.
18 What represents a health need is debatable, for instance, should such need be simply the biological
needs of patients or something more holistic that includes their psychological and social needs? Since
such a conceptual separation is challenging in children who cannot express a preference or states of mind,
in this discussion I interpret health need in the narrowly biological sense, separate from the patient’s
motivations and wider psychosocial needs. A clinician may of course be highly alert to these, but their
lack of expertise in nonmedical matters is a common criticism of paternalism.
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consensual decision. This description raises an immediate problem when the
decision is focused upon an infant, since SDM describes this process only if we are
willing for another to participate on the patient’s behalf. Thus, in an extensive
investigation of the ethics of SDM, Munthe et al. [51] observe that although the
absence of autonomy in children raises complications in SDM, these are generally
solved using models of family and relationship-centred care. I argue presently these
do not ensure the needs of the child are paramount. While the authors acknowledge
that there may be increased conflicts of interest when we involve those with external
interests in the patient’s wellbeing they do not concentrate their argument on this
point. While the autonomy model is apparently poorly calibrated to paediatrics, the
same paper lists a number of other benefits of SDM, including the strengthening of
clinical partnerships. These are admittedly important to paediatrics because lack of
parental compliance may present challenges to effective treatment of the child and
thus maintenance of trust between clinicians and parents is a concern. There are also
significant drawbacks in unilateral decision-making that are specific to making
decisions for infants. These rest on the uncertain locus of moral authority and
represent strong reasons to collaborate.
Drawbacks of Unilateral Decisions in Paediatric Healthcare
The location of moral authority in paediatric decision-making is a central point of
contention in the bioethical critique of best interests which encompasses a critique
of unilateral decision-making models akin to the typology presented by Charles
et al. [15]. The paternalistic standpoint argues that clinicians are best placed to make
a decision on the child’s behalf since they have the clearest understanding of a
child’s medical interests, and can glean other relevant information about the values
of the family, albeit such information is subsidiary, since the child is the focus of the
decision. Akin to the informed patient model is familialism. Because families are
naturally beneficent to their children and their interests closely allied, given the
necessary medical knowledge parents will have the clearest understanding of their
child’s overall interests, so should unilaterally make any decision. We can add to
these models what I term the ‘judicial approach’, which suggests that a neutral
arbiter, usually a judge, should make a final decision, rather than a doctor or a
family. Each of these unilateral approaches involves the communication of all the
pieces of the informational jigsaw to a single party, who then acts as arbiter to
produce a final decision.19 Such approaches may seem an attractive way to remedy
dispute, as they avoid the difficulties inherent in PSDM. However, since neither
clinicians, parents nor judges have clear moral authority in a best interests decision
19 To save words I have deliberately not considered Charles et al.’s [15] professional-as-agent model on
the grounds that it seems especially weak when applied to infants who have no history or preference on
which to base an agent’s decision. This inaccessibility suggests professional-as-agent fails in children on
basic epistemological grounds. Professional-as-agent seems strongly allied to models of substituted
judgement, which have been extensively criticised even in adults where past preferences are known [31,
33].
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with a strong moral component, such as those exemplified by the Re J [66], Glass
[30] and MB [2] cases, unilateral approaches present problems of moral validity.20
While the careful balance of evidence and rational argument in common law
suggests it contains elements we would expect to find in moral reasoning, legality
has an ambivalent relation to moral standing that suggests the judicial approach may
fail the test of moral validity. The dominant theoretical underpinning of positive law
suggests that there should be a separation of law and morality, and, although there is
arguably a moral component in many judgments, judges may disavow this.21
Certainly, working within the principle of stare decisis a court must conform with
precedent in a process that has little to do with moral reasoning. Paternalism is also
challengeable since medical interests are not all that are relevant to a child’s best
interests (there are types of good life involving sub-optimal health) and the expertise
of clinicians in medicine does not confer expertise in morality [9]. Meanwhile,
although a broadly based familialism has many advocates in bioethics [25, 39, 41,
71], the key assumption that intimate families are motivated by beneficence [71] is
contestable both because such beneficence is inherently controversial (since we
cannot access what is in the best interests of the child) and also because of the
motivation of families who abuse their children may be maleficent [44]. Accepting
this, some suggest adopting a threshold of family autonomy, below which positive
steps to intervene may be made. A wide variety of such thresholds have been
proposed including reasonableness [25], basic interests [47, 71], uncertainty [39]
and harm [21, 22, 25], yet these measures are not necessarily clear. The divided
academic response to legal notions of reasonableness is testament to its contest-
ability,22 and uncertainty and basic interests are not self evidently defensible
measures.23 A harm threshold alone may guard children from neglect24 but is a
contentious way to limit intensive care since death represents a harm of
indeterminable value.
Similarly, the partialities of each decision-making group may cause their
judgement to be questioned. Judges have been criticised for their lack of diversity,
conservative social attitudes [5, 8] and deference to medicine [87]. Clinicians appear
more pessimistic about the quality of life of disabled children than either parents or
the children themselves [80]. Practitioners may feel profound grief on the death of a
child [58], and it has been argued that repeated exposure to such emotions may lead
practitioners to aim for outcomes, such as treatment withdrawal, where they feel
they ultimately limit their regret, rather than risk emotional turmoil by taking a
chance on a favourable outcome that does not materialise [83]. Few families wish to
20 As we shall see, although SDM may avoid such problems by evoking the patient’s right to autonomy,
such problems also persist in PSDM because agreement does not necessarily equal moral legitimacy.
21 For example Ward LJ in Re A [62] at 969d.
22 For instance the response to the case of Re T [70]. Consider the differing standpoints of Fox and
McHale [27], Lyons [45] and Elliston [25] pp. 95–144 about the reasonableness of refusing a therapy for
which the risks and benefits are relatively well known.
23 Uncertainty invites the question: ‘how uncertain?’ Rawls’ natural primary goods [60] (on which basic
interests are predicated) of health, intelligence and vigour are clearly in need of revision if we are to
accommodate disability.
24 Indeed, in English law it assumes this protective purpose in s.31 of the Children Act 1989.
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harm their children, but the instinctive desire to protect a child’s life may prevent
families from rational consideration of the seriousness of an illness or the
hopelessness of a situation [82] and lead to overestimation of their own capacities as
long term carers [88]. There may also be considerable resource implications in
empowering parents over clinicians that affect wider health provision [51].
A further problem is that it is not self evident if treatment or non-treatment serves
best interests, since personal values dictate the relative desirability of death and life.
Many authors note an explicit link between best interests and the quality of life [14,
40, 81, 85] a link that manifests because we must apparently judge a child’s interests
on some measurable basis. Such criterion feature in practice guidelines [56, 72], and
are widely considered in practice [85]. Doubts remain over the validity of such
measures; self-reported quality of life in both children with disabilities [57, 73] and
families of very low birth weight children [79, 80] suggests these individuals’
quality of life is no different from their peers, particularly when adequate support is
in place. Although we must be cautious about generalising these data inappropri-
ately [34], it must give us pause to reconsider negative intuitions where quality of
life is in question,25 as well as to reflect that the lack of longitudinal tracking of
controversial outcomes is a severe impediment to our ability to learn from
experience.26
To these uncertainties we can add the need to make a decision urgently to avoid
negative consequences for both the patient and wider society. Society suffers
because resources will be expended. The patient suffers because the discomfort
associated with intensive care is considerable. Ventilation and intravenous lines are
encumbering, painful and distressing, despite routine medication for pain and
anxiety, the use of which is restricted by problems with tolerance and withdrawal
[55]. Such traumas can cause psychosis and long term psychological disturbance in
intensive care survivors [18] and clinicians are quick to describe futile intensive
care as torture and an affront to human dignity [11]. If we accept the child has
interests, we must also accept that doing nothing will affect them.
These issues of moral authority, non-self evident interests and urgency represent
extensive reasons against either unilateral decision-making or deferring the
decision. Yet these are negative reasons, rather than representing the positive
benefits of SDM. There are prudential reasons for including all parties; for instance,
25 It is not the focus of the paper to explore quality of life debates in depth, but we must note the very
complex and often contradictory nature of conclusions in the literature, both positive and negative, that
are dependent on a multitude of factors. Objective quality of life measures show no concurrence with
subjective measures, and arguments that self reported quality of life is inauthentic are inherently
controversial. Certainly we must be very cautious whenever quality of life data is presented as it is often
subject to considerable spin. Nevertheless, while it is not clear how much the neonatal intensive care
studies noted here can tell us about other outcomes—and it is arguable that they are irrelevant to very
profoundly disabled children—they nevertheless represent rare longitudinal data. It is also important to
note the undermining effect of social inequalities on these figures: Families without effective and
adequate support may not do well and positive evidence points to the fact that caregiver and sibling
quality of life is best in well supported families.
26 While studies such as EPICure [19] have given us more insight into the health implications for
extremely premature infants who survive, we know little directly of the experiences of the families and
children of families who insisted on treatment in defiance of medical advice, or allowed non-treatment
contrary to their own intuition.
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the shared stake in maintaining civil society that lies behind the perpetuation of the
rule of law may serve to defend a judicial approach. A desire to maintain the
institution of the family as a core, self supporting social unit may encourage
familialism. A belief in the moral mission of medicine may suggest medical
paternalism. The current legal tendency toward PSDM may represent a marriage of
these interests for the sake of a harmonious society. But this prudential basis seems
unsatisfactory if the needs of the child are to be paramount. While it could be argued
that it is for the individual collaborators to prioritise these needs, a purely prudential
explanation of PSDM seems incongruent with the paramountcy principle because it
focuses only upon the needs of collaborators rather than the quality of the
decision.27 This may be a particular problem since the best interests test already
seems to be afflicted by a special opacity. By claiming that the interests of children
are of special importance, it has been argued that the best interests test precludes
expression of any other legitimate interests [12], encouraging dishonest expression
of all interests as being in terms of the child [83]. Furthermore, as best interests only
allow the expression of a single set of interests that are arrived at in an opaque
manner, these interests may be hijacked by another party who claims their interests
concur with the child’s [16]. Of course, we may argue that PSDM is neither
concerned with nor responsible for these problems, and it is legitimate for a process
to consider the needs of the negotiating parties first and foremost. Yet the child’s
interests may be very slender and they are voiceless and may be easily forgotten.
Given the significant pressures towards conflating outside interests with those of the
child, it would be more satisfactory (and certainly more congruent with
paramountcy) if we could demonstrate that PSDM had positive benefits for the
child. The existence of such positive benefits does not seem so farfetched; let us
explore whether the literature on SDM can contribute such reasons.
Models of Shared Decision-Making
Munthe and Sandman [51, 75, 76] have published extensively on the subject of
SDM. In a typology of SDM models [75], these authors detail among others the
shared rational deliberative joint decision model (SJDM) and the professionally
driven best interests compromise model (PBCM). In the former model, a free
ranging discourse between the doctor and patient is envisaged, which results in a
consensus decision. This discourse is characterised by complete equality and
openness between the parties up to and including allowing their own interests to be
challenged and perhaps discarded in favour of the other. In contrast, the PBCM
pragmatically dispenses with equality and allows the doctor to take strategic action
to control the negotiation, so long as the doctor’s goal is to advance the patient’s
27 An alternative argument is that because the best interests of the child are innately uncertain PSDM
reduces both the level and the burden of that uncertainty. The second part of this argument seems to be
about unburdening the decision makers, so is a prudential one and remains incongruent with
paramountcy. In the first part, since the uncertainty of a decision is either soluble or not, we cannot
say that an intrinsically uncertain decision is less uncertain if we share it without offering reasons that
sharing reduces this uncertainty. I shall consider such reasons toward the end of this paper.
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best interests. This is done by giving the patient a frame of choices, modulated by
wider healthcare values, that range from that which is in their medical best interests
to that which merely satisfies a minimum medical standard. Since paternalism is
inefficient in advancing such interests (for instance by undermining the therapeutic
partnership) and does not respect autonomy, the strategic action that PBCM allows
the doctor must be openly communicated to the patient. While suggesting that
SJDM represents the ideal model, In the face of the considerable demands it makes
of participants, Sandman and Munthe [75] argue that PBCM represents a more
achievable balance between the need to guard both the best interests and the
autonomy of the patient.
PBCM is appealing in PSDM, since it seems to satisfy a parent’s need for
control while allowing the clinician to safeguard the child’s interests, perhaps by
offering a choice between two clinical therapies, or by setting limits when a
treatment is definitely painful, distressing or medically inappropriate. Yet it raises
concerns as well. The least of these is that we will satisfice, rather than maximise,
the child’s interests. Although diverging from the letter of the law, many
bioethicists have argued that satisficing is the de facto purpose of the best interests
test [13, 42]. More importantly PBCM seems to offer a reductionist account of
what is at stake in healthcare disputes. Healthcare disputes rarely involve a bald
choice between the effectiveness of therapy A and therapy B, with all other things
remaining equal. The human condition is complex and frequently there are also
moral elements at play. In such circumstances PBCM seems vulnerable to the
same criticism as paternalism, because clinicians are not moral experts.
Sufficiently differentiating PBCM from paternalism is difficult in these cases,
even when allowing some flexibility. For instance it has been noted that medical
views of treatment limits may significantly differ from families’ judgements of
when pain, distress or appropriateness outweigh the value of life or the chance of
recovery [86]. These differences may be so great that the range of clinically
acceptable options may completely fail to coincide with what the family finds
acceptable, leaving only the judicial approach to dispute resolution effective.28
Accepting this, we return to SJDM, where the aim is a free consensus between the
negotiating parties. The authors list a number of benefits for the patient, including
improved wellbeing, psychological benefits and improved compliance [51],29 yet
we must ask if these benefits apply to the non-autonomous infant or to their
parent. Granted, such a separation is often difficult to make since benefits to the
parent may benefit the child: parental wellbeing should improve their ability to
care for the child and to interact with clinicians. A child whose parents are non-
compliant is more likely to themselves be non-compliant. Yet the risk here is that
we take this conflated benefit for granted. There is clearly a point at which
parental compliance and wellbeing may be bought at a cost to the child.
28 In a review of the definition of futility in adult intensive care, Wilkinson and Savulescu [86] note the
difficulty in predicting outcomes when chances of survival chances are in the region of a few percent,
chances that may be clinically unacceptable but which appear acceptable to many families. They also
observe that, in adult care, even very slim chances of recovery or very great levels of disability may be
acceptable to many families.
29 The authors also list a number of extra risks to the patient that SDM entails.
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Furthermore, a parent who uses their influence upon the child as leverage in a
negotiation is clearly not partaking in SJDM but in a process of bargaining that
suggests a certain amount of bad faith. There may be further benefits to SJDM. As
a consensus model, it is similar to models of moral SDM, which focus upon
equitable ways to resolve the moral, rather than the clinical, aspects of disputes.
These also offer valuable reflections upon SDM at large.
Moral Shared Decision-Making
Moral SDM encompasses models that characterise SDM as negotiation.30 Huxtable
[38] suggests we might solve moral dilemmas using moral compromise where
parties trade concessions in order to reach a shared decision that advances some of
their original interests. Moreno [48] provides a contrasting model, moral consensus.
This requires the negotiants to enter the process of moral SDM free of a fixed
agenda and open to entirely new perspectives in a way conceptually similar to
SJDM. Moreno suggests consensus is distinguished from compromise by its
untethering of a solution from the fixed interests of participants. However, Moreno
readily acknowledges that some moral disputes are too entrenched to meet these
demands,31 and the best that can be hoped for is a compromise position; indeed,
these criticisms notwithstanding, compromise and consensus are readily conflated,
and at times Moreno’s own careful attempts to distinguish them appear to fail.32
Furthermore, Huxtable also envisages some abandonment of fixed starting positions,
so for the purposes of the ongoing discussion I suggest that the analysis on which
both compromise and consensus is based is sufficiently similar for the distinction
not to concern us. I shall base my discussion on Huxtable’s analysis, which offers a
typology of reasons for compromise.33
Compromise and consensus have each been criticised as flawed and anathema to
moral debate. While consensus has been criticised for stifling dissent, Moreno
counters that, without some eventual point of agreement, dissent is self defeating
[48]. Holm [36] suggests that compromise either muddles our understanding of what
is good or represents an unacceptable surrender of our core moral beliefs. Taking
Moreno’s argument further, Huxtable [38] counters with reasons compromise is
morally superior to endless dissent. First, in compromise we prudentially advance
some of our aims. Second, where we lack resources to honour all claims, we can
30 I note that Sandman [74] suggests that negotiation poorly describes the process of SDM because SDM
is not a bargain between equals where there are gains for both sides but instead is a compromise between
the clinician’s altruistic consideration of the patient’s best interests and the patient’s values. While I
accept that SDM is a complex interaction, I suggest this critique does not fit a situation where the best
interests of the patient are not self evident, while the question of altruism appears obfuscatory in PSDM
because each party has an equally tenable claim to be acting altruistically.
31 Such as those concerned with euthanasia and termination of pregnancy.
32 For instance in his chapter on National Ethics Commissions [48] pp. 73–87.
33 I acknowledge some readers may nevertheless find Huxtable’s adoption of the term ‘compromise’
uncomfortable. In their writings on compromise and consensus both Huxtable [38] pp. 127–132 and
Moreno [48] pp. 12–13 acknowledge that many philosophers feel these terms have negative connotations
when attached to moral validity. I briefly consider the main arguments below.
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only justly share by compromise. Third, some decisions cannot defensibly be
abandoned. Fourth, it serves the necessity of co-existence between disputants. Fifth,
the uncertain defensibility of ethical decisions mean we should consider other points
of view based on alternatives. Lastly, the complexity of moral decisions means we
may fail to see potential deficiencies of our own reasoning, and potential strengths
in others’.
Because compromise entails collaborators abandoning their moral starting
positions to reach an agreement for potentially prudential reasons, Huxtable
proposes criteria to mark morally defensible compromise. Echoing suggestions in
SJDM and consensus, to prevent compromise being used as a combative process to
extract the maximum from a situation, participants must be reflective, their agenda
must be transparent and they must be respectful of the moral worth of the other
party. Since all these models suggest fairly demanding conditions for collaborators,
let us first consider the practical problems these demands pose, before we examine
what compromise offers a defence of SDM.
Risks and Benefits
Shared decision-making (SDM) is not incontestably beneficial, and Munthe and
Sandman have done much to elucidate the risks it may involve, as well as
questioning the presumption that patients may be able or willing to actualise their
autonomy [51]. Similarly moral SDM is a demanding process that entails equality
and abandonment of personal interests, [48, 75] as well as reflexivity, transparency
and respect for the other party [38]. Although a presumption against these abilities
seems premature given the lack of empirical information about PSDM at the
bedside, it nevertheless seems likely that clinicians and parents will not always fulfil
these criteria. Impossibly demanding criteria may leave unchecked outside pressures
toward displacing children’s interests and the hijacking of children’s interests by
others. While we must acknowledge potential goods in PSDM, we must also
carefully weight these against the risks involved, and either take steps to reform
PSDM to avoid them or to consider if children’s interests should be inviolable. We
must also make these processes as effective as possible, and consider the ability of
parents and clinicians to satisfy demanding criteria alone. The fact that such
demands seem more easily attainable by disinterested parties leads Huxtable to
focus his arguments upon SDM that has entered the courtroom, and it is worthwhile
to consider whether a similar venue is necessary for effective SDM. Moreno alerts
us to the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel [78], who considers the attributes of
groups. Simmel suggests that groups of three (triads) possess unique qualities of
intimacy, mediation and durability that are lacking in groups of two (dyads). This
observation may suggest that PSDM involving a dyad of parents and clinicians will
be more vulnerable to breakdown in negotiation and the addition of a third party
may create a beneficial dynamic. The identity of this party is moot; however, one
may speculate that this party would need to be both mutually respected and
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independent. Since these qualities are found in the judicial process, perhaps it
should be involved more routinely.34
While the demanding nature of these models represents a practical problem,
moral SDM may offer strong reasons against unilateral decisions. These reasons are
drawn of either necessity, or a desire for a harmonious, equitable society—
prominently seen in the suggestion that we can achieve some of our aims, and
negotiate our share of scarce resources. Yet again these only count as negative
reasons against unilateral decisions, rather than positive reasons for SDM. If we
search for such reasons, the overarching argument is that moral SDM conforms to
the pluralistic tenets of a liberal society. These suggest that the moral foundations of
a democratic society must be based on respect for individuals, equitability and
peaceful settlement of disputes; in other words, a vision of a moral society that is
predicated upon a vision of societal self interest.35 Moral liberals may therefore
claim that a society that values SDM is just and respects autonomy; this benefits all
parties who share the decision and belong to such a society. However this
explanation lacks reasons why moral SDM will produce morally valid answers
when we are making decisions on behalf of persons with unknown wishes. This
focus on the process of decision making rather than the quality of the decision may
be due to deficiencies in the model of pluralism upon which such theories are built
[7, 38, 48]. This model tends to be Rawls’ reasonable pluralism [61], which
suggests that because people have different goals, psychologies and experiences, it
will be impossible even for those who are honest, reasonable and try their best to be
unbiased to agree about their responses to every moral situation. Because of this
disagreement, if we wish to avoid coercion we must focus on areas of consensus and
accept that areas outside this consensus will remain the subject of dispute. Rawls
avoids a collapse into relativism, suggesting that although consensus on many moral
principles is not required, we must triangulate our principles with a just political
regime that treats individuals fairly. Although I shall not dispute the coherence of
this theory in consideration of moral agents who are capable of expressing their
wishes, it appears deficient when used to justify making decisions on behalf of those
whose wishes are unknown. I have already argued that, as individuals, doctors,
parents and judges lack the moral authority to be sole arbiters of moral disputes.
What we still lack is a robust explanation of why PSDM collectively imbues them
with this authority, and pluralism is deficient on this count.36
34 There are other parties we might also consider such as a national or hospital clinical ethics committee.
The latter is favoured by Huxtable [38], although whether an institutional body would be viewed as
sufficiently independent, or have the degree of authority required requires investigation.
35 More neutrally this could be expressed as a preference for a particular type of society.
36 It is worth noting Richard Miller [46] attempts to use a similar structure of pluralism and liberal theory
to accomplish such a justification. Miller roots paediatric medical decision making in the shared
guardianship of children’s basic needs (which Miller identifies as physical, intellectual and emotional
welfare, respect and rights to an open future), which primarily rest with the parent unless it can be
demonstrated a child’s welfare will suffer. While such a theory could support PSDM as an expression of a
shared intention of promoting a child’s welfare (although this is a rather anaemic argument), Miller leaves
it to rest on the suggestion that provided a family uphold the child’s basic interests, favouring family
autonomy is the best way to safeguard children’s welfare, which I have already suggested is not always
the case.
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Qualities of Shared Decisions
The theories presented then, fail to expound ways in which PSDM may offer a
better quality of decision to the infant who is its subject. These problems may not be
insoluble although I suggest that further philosophical research is needed to explain
why this might be so in moral disputes. This is no mean undertaking since it
involves an exploration of the nature of epistemological and moral reality that is
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, one might sketch some of the features
of such an explanation. For instance, it is often taken for granted that widespread
agreement enhances accuracy, and certainly statistical agreement of independent
physical measurements is more likely to indicate correctness than error. Yet how
such observations affect the verification of ethical viewpoints reached by SDM
requires subscription to certain epistemological and philosophical concepts. One
argument may embrace Nagel’s [52] gradualist paradigm of objectivity, which
suggests that we may consider positions more or less objective if they have some of
the features we expect of objectivity [50]. If we then accept that moral facts are real
and discoverable, and that rationality is the key to this discovery, we can claim the
more independent rational arguments that agree on a particular position the closer
we have come to an objective reality. Another argument suggests that group
decisions may reduce individual bias, especially if the opinions within the group are
diverse. Evidence for the psychological basis of this has been discussed elsewhere
[32], although we must balance this by noting that we have long known that
individuals are susceptible to group pressures to conform, especially if they are a
lone voice [49]. A further argument may be that a more complex appreciation of the
consequences of a best interest decision may be elucidated if we consult more
widely. However, depending on our understanding of ethics, consequences may
vary in importance.37 These arguments may be extended, but none are yet
completely compelling, even if we accept the philosophical commitments they
require. For the present, perhaps the best we can say at present is that, in
combination with other methods such as empirical fact finding, shared decisions
may sometimes be better than those taken unilaterally.38
Scope for Reform
Whatever the approach taken, making decisions in the best interests of children
presents a number of challenges. In cases where the decision concerns whether
arduous and prolonged treatment is for the best, and where the chances of survival
are marginal and it is expected that the child will have a severe impairment should
they recover, these challenges are even more acute. Such decisions depend not only
on medical prognostication and the chances of recovery (and what a ‘good’ chance
37 In other words, a thoroughgoing consequentialist will invest all the moral importance of a decision in
its consequences, whereas a similarly committed deontologist will invest none.
38 Of course, working out which times will remain tricky, and represents a further problem to be
addressed.
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is may not be the same to both doctors and parents), but how much value there is in
a life of acute disability. Where the wishes of the child are inaccessible, we have no
recourse to the principle of autonomy to help us. Naturally, parents and doctors will
have their own opinions, and the fact that parents are closely bonded to the child and
are irrevocably affected by the outcome means that it seems reasonable to include
their opinions. In these circumstances, the principle of paramountcy, even in its
mildest form, suggests that the decision making process must value children and
ensures their voices are not marginalised. In the legal context Choudhry and
Fenwick [17] have argued that the basic tenets of the paramountcy principle, by
favouring the child above all others, sharply contradicts the presumptive equality of
competing rights that is enshrined in the Human Rights Act, suggesting
paramountcy is ripe for reform. Yet defending the principle Herring [35] suggests
this it remains important because children are often unable to promote their own
interests, and without some formal priority, children’s interests are easily
overlooked. The basic voicelessness of children is a strong argument that a
reasonable criteria for PSDM should sacrifice neither the benefits to participants of
SDM, nor the safeguards to the child expressed within the principle of paramountcy.
It is nevertheless easy to offer arguments which support abandoning a formal
commitment to paramountcy For instance we may argue that although PSDM does
not offer a superior moral position, neither is it inferior, and that the benefits it offers
negotiating parties are significant enough to support its use. Although it seems
philosophically correct to consider that the child has separate and identifiable
interests, these are inaccessible and paramountcy is rhetoric and pretence. On the
other hand, we may respond that the best interests principle is not a practical
position but a guiding ideal to promote the interests of children [35, 42]. From this
point of view, the problem with PSDM is that implementation of this ideal is too
opaque, and a more transparent method should be considered. Although the gap
between children’s welfare and rights is not always easily defined, some have
suggested that open recognition that the interests of children and parents may
conflict encourages a transparent approach to making decisions on behalf of
children. A rights based approach does not preclude expression of the competing
values at work, allowing all claims to be considered fairly [6, 23, 24] and the rights
of the child to be aired and appropriately weighted. While the question of who
should determine the child’s rights is not without its own problems [35], such an
approach would give the child an independent voice in PSDM.
Conclusion
Understood broadly, the best interests test means that the interests of children
should never be forgotten within a world of adult concerns [35]. Although it is
questionable that SDM can be instrumental in promoting these interests, the English
courts have promoted a model of PSDM. While judges may theoretically arbitrate,
evidence from critical care environments suggests that in disputes about children’s
best interests they are rarely involved and almost all conflicts are resolved privately.
Since PSDM is demanding, and outside pressures may conflict with the best
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interests principle, empirical studies would be valuable to determine what drives
these private processes of PSDM. On a more theoretical level, if we accept that no
single decision-making group can lay an indefeasible claim to moral authority,
PSDM represents the ‘least bad’ method of making decisions about children. Yet
examination of several models of SDM indicates that any positive benefits it offers
are to the decision makers, for example, in offering psychological and welfare
benefits to parents, and also benefits to society, by promoting social cohesion and a
civil society. The child benefits from these only by association with adult
beneficiaries, and such benefits may be variable. As the focus of best interests is
supposed to be the child, founding a decision-making strategy on the benefits it
offers to decision-makers, even if these sometimes percolate to the child, seems
incongruent with this. Worse, because children’s voices are absent from the process
and their interests are bound to others, PSDM shares the problem with any
paediatric decision-making strategy that other interests may be supplant those of the
child in the final decision. In hand with the demands PSDM places on decision
makers, this incongruence is especially uncomfortable, and it would be reassuring if
we could identify positive reasons for PSDM. For instance we may claim that a
multiplicity of independent rational arguments with similar conclusions make us
more likely to reach the correct answer. Similarly we could suggest that group
decision-making reduces bias or that more consequences are imagined. Yet none of
these ideas are incontestable and a deeper philosophical investigation should be
undertaken. Moreover, the practical process by which PSDM takes place already
appear to depend on a participant’s satisfaction of demanding criteria—these may
be complicated further by such a philosophical investigation and it is likely that the
current process of PSDM will require reform. Perhaps these reasons will not even be
practically achievable. Should they not, we may need to radically re-evaluate
current processes, we might for instance abandon PSDM as poorly adapted to the
paediatric paradigm, or overhaul the best interests test to suggest that children’s
interests need not be paramount. Neither of these solutions seems unproblematic. In
the meantime, the child’s place in collaborative decision might benefit from
allowing a more open recognition that each participant brings competing interests to
the decision.
SDM has become orthodoxy in healthcare as a way to make medical decision-
making comply with the principle of autonomy. Yet autonomy is a complex issue
and SDM cannot simply be grafted onto existing processes without analysis.
Analysis now suggests that the benefits of SDM in the care of competent adults may
have concurrent risks. PSDM too seems to have become orthodoxy with insufficient
consideration of the commitments it involves and the benefits it may accrue to the
child. Although it may benefit decision-making parties, much more work needs to
be undertaken to determine if these benefits imply unacceptable risks to the interests
of the child.
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